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Since 1978, the Bakke decision has been the guiding legal principle
underlying affirmative action in higher education. Recent attacks on Bakke
have caused considerable anxiety among supporters of affinnative action and
some celebration among opponents. This Article assesses the impact ofBakke
on black and Hispanic enrollment in law and medical schools, using three
major sources of evidence. The Article concludes that while the decision was
significant because it legitimated and institutionalized the practice of affirmative
action in higher education, it produced almost no change in pre-Bakke levels
of minority applications and enrollment or admissions decisions made about
minorities. Thus, Bakke's effect on boosting or curtailing minority enrollment
was far less than either supporters or opponents predicted.
I. INTRODUCTION
When we began this project in the mid-1980s, affirmative action and the
compromises articulated in the Regents of the University of California v.
Bakkel decision seemed to be a settled and accepted part of public policy. To be
sure, much of the white public had never accepted some of the more far-
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reaching affirmative action practices, but even so, there was some support for
giving African Americans extra opportunities in education and employment.
The Reagan Administration opposed affirmative action, but the administration's
attempts to dismantle programs were largely frustrated by Congress and the
courts. In that setting, our objective was to determine how much of an impact
on medical and law school enrollments the landmark, but confusing, Bakke case
actually had.
As we complete this project in 1998, the political climate for affirmative
action has altered dramatically. The United States Supreme Court has shifted
ground with a stream of cases narrowing the scope of affirmative action
practices. 2 In Hopwood v. Texas,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected the University of Texas Law School's justifications for
racial preferences-which were to achieve a diverse student body, combat a
hostile environment at the school, alleviate a poor reputation in the minority
community, and eliminate present effects of past discrimination by actors other
than the law school itself-and barred the use of race in admissions decisions.
Additionally, many members of the Republican congressional majority
stridently oppose affirmative action. In California, voters approved a state
constitutional amendment to prohibit race, sex, color, ethnicity, and national
origin as considerations in "discriminating against, or granting preferential
treatment to, any individual or group in the operation of the State's system of
public employment, public education or public contracting." 4 The Regents of
the University of California, the original defendants in the Bakke case, 5 have
barred racial preference schemes in admission to the University, 6 and many
other institutions are reviewing their practices in light of the changed legal and
political climate.
Public commentary points out the dire consequences of Hopwood and the
California decisions for minority enrollments. 7 Analysts often point out that
these decisions are rolling back the Bakke decision.8 In that context, it is
especially important to discover the actual consequences of the Bakke decision.
2 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989); Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Grove City College v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
3 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
4 Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TimEs, June 11, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 39, 66.
5 See 438 U.S. at 266.
6 See Lemann, supra note 4, at 36, 66.
7 See SUSAN WELcH & JOHN GRuiL, AFFnzMATiVE ACrION AND MINoarrY
ENRouMp-rs iN MEDICAL AND LAW SCHooL 147-57 (1998).
8 See id.
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The purpose of our study was to answer the question-Did Bakke matter?
In Part H of this Article, we explicate the Bakke decision. In Part H, we
examine three major sources of evidence-aggregate enrollment trends, effects
of the decision on individual institutions, and views of admissions officials-in
order to ascertain the impact of the decision on minority enrollment in law and
medical schools. In Part IV, we attempt to answer the question-Does Bakke
matter today? In Part V, we conclude that affirmative action alone can make
only a small difference in improving equality in educational and employment
opportunities. Nonetheless, until we, as a society, can muster the national will
to adopt more effective public policies for combating racism, rolling back
affirmative action will only constitute a step backwards in our nation's fight for
racial equality.
II. THE BAKKE DECISION
In 1978, the Supreme Court issued its famous, or infamous, decision in
Bakke.9 The ruling invalidated the admission plan of the medical school at the
University of California-Davis (hereinafter "UC-Davis"), which reserved 16 of
100 places in each year's entering class for racial minorities. 10 The divided
Court held that the school could not reserve a certain number of places for
minorities, but it could use race as a positive factor in admissions."I
Despite its current status as a bedrock of affirmative action practices in
education, the decision devastated many civil rights activists of the
time.' 2 Despite the initial attention lavished on this single case, there has been
scarcely any systematic focus on its impact.' 3
Bakke was an unusually high profile case. Observers followed as it climbed
step by step through the California courts. When the U.S. Supreme Court
9 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
10 See id. at 275.
11 See id. at 305-14, 319-20.
12 Jesse Jackson, for example, exhorted his supporters to "rebel." See Conflicting
Reactions to the Bakke Decision, THE CHRON. OF IGHER EDUC., July 3, 1978, at A12
[hereinafter Reactions].
13 See, e.g., Steven Shea & Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Entry of Black and Other
Minority Students Into U.S. Medical Schools, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 933 (1985) (analyzing
African American professional school trends without focusing on Bakke); JAMES E.
BLACKWELL, ADVOCACY AND STRATEGIC INTERVENI=ON: THE HIGHER EDUCATION
PROGRAM OF THE SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION: A TWELVE YEAR REPORT (1987)
(analyzing African American medical school enrollment trends, implying that Bakke had an
effect). But see TIMoTHY J. O'NEiL, BArKE AND THE PoLmucs OF EQuALTY (1985); RON
SIMMONS, AFFmMATIVE AcrIoN: CoNFur AND CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION AFER
BA m (1982).
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agreed to hear the case, more than one hundred organizations filed a record
number of arnicus curiae briefs. 14 Magazines featured cover stories on the
case, 15 and commentators anticipated the result. 16 Commentators called Bakke
the most important civil rights case since Brown v. Board of Education.17 Bakke
would determine not only the validity of one school's admissions plan, but the
composition of many schools' classes for many subsequent years. Moreover,
Bakke was expected to determine the legality of affirmative action and the speed
of further civil rights progress in American society.
Even years after the decision, Bakke seemed important. In 1987, when
Justice Louis Powell, who authored the main opinion, retired, he was asked
which of his opinions was the most important.' 8 "Bakke," he replied without
hesitation.19 Today, nearly two decades after the case was decided, its issues
and holdings have become a centerpiece of a renewed public debate over
affirmative action.
The case began when Allan Bakke, a white engineer who decided to
become a doctor, applied for admission to eleven medical schools. 20 Although
Bakke had good test scores, he was older than the schools preferred, and he was
rejected by all of them.21 The following year, Bakke applied to UC-Davis and
was again rejected.22 In both years that Bakke applied to UC-Davis, the school
admitted through the special admissions program some minority applicants
whose test scores and grades were lower than Bakke's.2 3 In addition, UC-Davis
admitted some white applicants whose test scores and grades were lower than
14 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 268-70; see also O'NWE, supra note 13, at 3-6 (listing
organizations that submitted amicus curiae briefs and briefly discussing the strife the
organizations experienced as a result of taking a position on affirmative action and quotas).
15 See, e.g., Cheryl Fields, In Bakke's Victory, No Death Knell for Affirmative Action,
THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 3, 1978, at Al.
16 See Frederick R. Lynch, Affirmative Action, the Media and the Public, 28 AM.
BEHAv. Sci. 807, 811 (1985).
17 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregating school children based on race violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
18 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: aImATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 1 (1988).
19 See id.
20 See ALLAN P. SINDLER, BAKKE, DEFUVIS, AND MINOrry ADMISSIONS: THE QUEsr
FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY 66-69 (1978).
21 See id.
2 2 See id. at 73-77 (describing the administrative decisions leading to Bakke's second
rejection from the University of California-Davis medical school).
23 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1978) (providing
tables comparing Bakke's scores and grades to those of average and special admitees).
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Bakke's through the school's regular admissions procedures. 24
When the medical school at UC-Davis opened its doors in 1968, it had no
African-American or Hispanic students. 25 The next year it had just two blacks
and one Hispanic student.26 In 1970, the UC-Davis faculty, like many schools'
faculties, voted to establish a special admissions program for "economically or
educationally disadvantaged" students because of the small number of minority
applicants. 27 When the school doubled its entering class to 100 in 1971, it
reserved 16 of these places for students selected through the special admissions
program.28 Although the program was open to "disadvantaged" students of all
races, it was established primarily for blacks and Hispanics. 29 Few Native
Americans applied.30 Numerous Asians applied but most were evaluated
through the regular admissions procedures. 31 Many whites applied to the
medical school, but none were accepted through the special admissions
program.32 The Dean of Admissions later acknowledged that the program was
not tailored to take into account lower class whites or middle class minorities. 33
Bakke sued because he had been passed over in favor of minorities with
lower scores. He claimed reverse discrimination and asserted the Equal
Protection Clause.34 Although the school passed over Bakke in favor of some
whites with lower scores, Bakke had no constitutional or statutory grounds for
challenging these admissions.
In June 1978, the Supreme Court announced the Bakke decision. Justice
Powell did not exaggerate when he said, "[w]e speak today with a notable lack
of unanimity."'35 There was no majority opinion. In six separate opinions the
Justices split on the two key issues: whether quotas are unconstitutional and
whether using race as a positive factor is unconstitutional. 36 One bloc of four
24 See JOEL DREYFuSS & CHARM LAWENCE III, THm BAKKE CASE: THE PO=TCS OF
INEQUATY 20 (1979).
25 See O'NEL, supra note 13, at 26.
26 See id.
27 See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 24, at 19; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note
18, at4.
2 8 See Bakke, 480 U.S. at 275; see also DREYFuSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 24, at 19.
29 See Bakke, 480 U.S. at 275.
30 See DREyFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 24, at 19.
31 See id. at 19.
32 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 4.
33 See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 24, at 42.
34e SCHwARTZ, supra note 18, at 16.
35 Id. at 143.
36 See Bakke, 480 U.S. at 269, 324, 379, 387, 402, 408.
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Justices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and Stewart-
apparently concluded that both the quota and any use of race as a positive factor
were invalid.37 Another bloc of four-Justices Blackmsun, Brennan, Marshall,
and White-concluded that both quotas and using race as a positive factor were
valid.38 Powell was the swing Justice, maintaining that the quota was
unconstitutional but the use of race as a positive factor was not.39 Thus, Powell
provided the fifth vote for one issue from each bloc, and his opinion became the
controlling opinion.
Justice Powell, using "strict scrutiny," considered whether the program
served a compelling governmental interest.4° He rejected all of the university's
justifications except for its need to establish a diverse student body.41 However,
Justice Powell stated that it was not necessary to set aside a certain number of
seats to accomplish this goal.42 Thus, he proclaimed that the program violated
both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.43 Justice Powell concluded that schools could use
race to obtain a more diverse student body and approvingly cited the Harvard
Plan. He added an explanation of this plan to the appendix.44
However, Powell's opinion does not clearly distinguish what schools can
and cannot do. They cannot use an obvious quota or set-aside. They should not
use separate procedures to evaluate applications from different racial groups.
But can they use a flexible "goal" rather than a fixed quota? Powell called this a
"semantic distinction" that was "beside the point," 45 but Harvard implied that it
set a goal. 46 If schools do not use a flexible "goal," but weight some races
differently and enroll about the same number of minorities every year, is this
different significantly from using what is forbidden?
Brennan maintained that there was "no constitutional distinction" between
37 See id. at 420-21. Stevens, arguing for this bloc, chided the other five Justices for
addressing the issue of race as a positive factor in admissions. He considered these statements
dicta. Yet, Stevens seems to address this issue implicitly. Moreover, it is hard to conceive
that Stevens and his bloc could reach any conclusion other than that race could not be used at
all, given their interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
38 See id. at 378.
3 9 See id. at 320.
40 See id. at 305.
41 See id. at 307-15.
42 See id. at 316-17.
43 See id. at 270-71.
44 See id. at 316-18, 321-24.
4 5 Id. 288-89.
46 See id. at 323-24.
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the two approaches. 47 The only difference is that the Harvard Plan "proceeds in
a manner that is not immediately apparent to the public," whereas the UC-
Davis program is more open.48 Blackmun echoed these views, stating the line
was "thin and indistinct." 49 Powell replied that the crucial difference was the
"facial intent to discriminate." 50 Yet, Powell acknowledged that a plan that used
race as a selection criterion could be "simply a subtle and more sophisticated-
but no less effective-means of according racial preference than the Davis
program." 51 Further, in a passage directed toward school officials, Powell
assured that "a court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a
facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the
functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be
presumed .... "52 While the distinction exists in theory, it might not appear in
practice.
The Bakke decision was covered extensively by the media, both national
and specialized.53 Commentators, reflecting the split ruling, were divided about
the likely effect.54 One study of editorial reaction by nineteen daily newspapers
found an emphasis upon the balanced outcome of the decision.55 Surprisingly,
there was relatively little criticism. Perhaps the compromise in the result, or
possibly the ambiguity of the ruling, neutralized potential opponents in the
press.
Yet, activists feared the worst. Civil rights activists, perhaps taking their
cue from Justice Marshall's pessimistic opinion, foresaw negative
47 See id. at 378.
48 Id. at 379.
49 Id. at 406.
50 Id. at 318.
51 1d.
52 Id. at 318-19.
53 For example, the weekly newspaper devoted to higher education, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, began its coverage of Bakke in September 1976 with a story on the
California Supreme Court's opinion. See Beverly T. Watkins, Minority Admissions Plan Held
Unconstitutional in Caifornia, THE CHRON. OF HIGHmR EDUC., Sept. 27, 1976, at A3. THE
CHRONICLE then featured the United States Supreme Court ruling on page one in its first issue
after the decision. See Fields, supra note 15, at Al. Titling its coverage, In Bakke's Victory
No Death Knell for Affirmative Action, THE CHRONICLE printed complete texts of the Powell,
Brennan, and Stevens opinions in that issue, see supra at A3-12, and the remainder of the
opinions in the next issue. See 3 Separate Opinions in the Bakke Case, THE CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., July 10, 1978, at Al1-13. Additionally, both issues also featured extensive
commentary and reactions from both legal analysts and advocacy groups.
54 See DRmUss & LAwRENCE, supra note 24, at 225-27.
55 See William Haltom, Before and After Bakke: Editorialists and Judicial Mediation
(undated) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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consequences. The NAACP called the ruling "a major disappointment." 56 The
Amsterdam News headlined the story, "Bakke: We Lose!"'57 Jesse Jackson,
comparing the decision with the withdrawal of federal troops from the South
after Reconstruction, proclaimed, "[b]lack people will again be
unprotected ... we must not greet this decision with a conspiracy of
silence.. . we must rebel. "58 The spokesperson for the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund noted that while Bakke won a symbolic
victory, most affirmative action programs would be lawful under the standards
of the case. 59 However, the Congressional Black Caucus emphasized that the
Court upheld the use of race, and it urged that this point be publicized to shore
up support for affirmative action policies. 60
Some opponents of affirmative action applauded the ruling. Some
conservative activists, however, predicted that Powell's opinion would drive
quota programs "underground;" 61 while universities would purport to adopt the
Harvard Plan, they would continue to use de facto quota programs. Thus,
Powell's opinion would "produce much the same result" as before but with "an
encouragement of duplicity." 62
The Court did not decide any other cases involving school admissions
through 1987, but it did sanction affirmative action. 63 It upheld race-conscious
remedies, including quotas if evidence of past discrimination existed. 64 It
invalidated affirmative action only when whites with more seniority were laid
56 NAACP Statement on Implications of the Bakke Decision, 86 T Cuss 41, 42
(1979).
57 The Age of Less, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1978, at 19-26.
58 Reactions, supra note 12, at 12.
59 See id. at 12.
60 See SINDLER, supra note 20, at 317.
61 See Nathan Glazer, Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination: 2, 66
COMMENTARY, Sept. 1978, at 36, 39.
62 William J. Bennett & Terry Eastland, Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination:
1, 66 COMMENTARY, Sept. 1978, at 29, 32.
63 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987); United States
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987); International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986); Sheetnaetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 487 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980); United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). But see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 282-84 (1986) (disallowing layoffs of senior non-minorities before minorities);
Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-83 (1984) (holding that "make-whole"
relief is only available to those who have actually suffered illegal discrimination).
64 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 153, 166, 185-86; International Ass'n of Firefighters, 478
U.S. at 515-17; Sheetmetal Workers', 478 U.S. at 445-51; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490-92;
Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
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off instead of minorities with less seniority. 65 If these rulings had any effect on
the impact of Bakke, they should have reinforced the use of race as a positive
factor in the decade after the decision.
Im. THE STUDY
Although Bakke affected many types of schools, our research assesses
Bakke's impact on applications and admissions to medical and law schools. 66
We chose to examine medical and law schools for several reasons. First, we
chose to examine medical schools because Bakke occurred in this context.
Second, we chose to examine law schools because the Supreme Court
sidestepped a previous case involving law school admissions, 67 and law school
faculty are aware of and sensitive to legal decisions. Third, medical and law
schools had more special programs to recruit and retain minorities than other
professional schools, 68 and admission to these schools had become highly
competitive by the time of the Bakke decision. For all of these reasons, Bakke's
impact, if any, should be apparent in an examination of these schools.
This study examines both the ultimate targets of the ruling, the students,
and those who were responsible for implementing the ruling-the admissions
officials. 69 We use three sources of information. First, national application and
enrollment trends over a twenty-year period before and after Bakke allow us to
examine macro-level year-to-year changes in students' decisions to apply and in
enrollments. Second, cross-sectional information on individual schools before
and after Bakke highlights micro-level changes in enrollments across schools.
Third, 1989 survey responses from admissions officers in medical and law
schools reveal their perceptions of Bakke's impact and of their admissions
policies. In each of the sections below, we will describe in more detail the data
used.
65 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270, 282-84; Stotts, 467 U.S. at 567, 572-76, 583.
66 It is important to note that our data sources are more complete for medical schools
than law schools. Accurate time series data on minority applications and acceptances to law
schools in pre-Bakke years are unavailable.
67 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1974).
68 See FRANK j. ATELs & IRENE L. GROMBERG, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
EDUCATION, SPECIAL PROGRAMS FOR FaMLAI AND MINoarrY GRADUATE STUDENTs, No.
41, 6-8 (1978).
69 For a more comprehensive overview of the study, see WELCH & GRUHL, supra note
7, at 109.
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IV. DiD BAKKE MA=TER?
A. Aggregate Enrollment Trends
Perhaps the most direct way to examine the impact of Bakke is to look at
nationwide trends in African-American and Hispanic enrollment.70 We have
collected data on several key trends, including minority applications, admission,
and enrollment, beginning as early as 1951 for some variables, and as late as
1973 for others. These data can show us how, if at all, both students and
admissions committees changed their behavior over time in response to Bakke
or to other factors.
We begin by examining the aggregate trends in black and Hispanic
first-year medical school enrollment. As Figure 1 shows, African-American
enrollment jumped from about 200 in 1965 to almost 1200 in 1975. African-
American enrollments were very stagnant through the next decade, increasing
only gradually. In the late 1980s, enrollment again began to increase
significantly and accelerated in the 1990s to a peak of more than 1500. The
trends were generally similar for Hispanics, except for the 1975 to 1985 period,
which showed a slow upward growth with a plateau in the late 1980s.
The Bakke decision had little effect on either of these time series. The steep
upward climb in enrollment had reached a plateau before Bakke and would not
resume until more than a decade after the decision.
Although the longitudinal patterns are somewhat different, the same
conclusion can be reached about black and Latino first-year enrollment in law
schools. For African-American enrollment, the year of the Bakke decision was
only one point in a period of relative stagnation from about 1975 to 1986. This
was followed by a rather sharp increase beginning in 1987. Hispanic enrollment
rose slowly but fairly consistently over the entire period for which we have
data-1969 to 1995. Only in 1975, 1983, and 1995 did enrollment decrease
from the year before. Again, Bakke seems irrelevant to interpreting these time
series data.
We also have data on medical school applications beginning in 1973.
Applications by both African-American and Latino students were fairly stagnant
from 1973 through 1983. The two patterns then diverged-African-American
applications actually declined until they began to increase steeply in the late
1980s. This continued until 1994 when applications began to decline.
Applications from Hispanic students stayed very constant until 1990, when they
began a slow but perceptible increase through 1996. Again, however, the Bakke
70 Data sources include AAMC (selected years), the Lawyer's Almanac (selected
years), and personal communications from Rick Morgan of the American Bar Association.
These data are based on individuals' self reports of race and etlnicity.
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decision appeared to have no impact on these trends for either African
Americans or Hispanics.
FiLre 1: Black and Hispanic First Year Medical School Enrollment
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Figure 2: Black and Hispanic First Year Law School Enrollment
Number of enrollees (in 000s)
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Figure 3: Black and Hispanic Applications to Medical School
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In order to calculate the impact of Bakke more precisely than could be done
from a visual inspection of the graphs, we utilized the following: annual data on
several application, admission, and enrollment variables; a model that included
a short term effect and long term effect and several control variables; and time
series methodology. Our time series analyses began either in 1968 or as soon
thereafter as data were available and ended in 1987. This period allowed us to
focus more precisely on Bakke than would a longer time period. The longer the
time period examined, the more difficult it is to separate Bakke's effects from
others, because "the repercussions of all government actions ramify indefinitely
and interrelate with other phenomena, both public and private, many of which
simply cannot be quantified and indeed often cannot even be identified." 71
Control variables included a dummy variable for the Reagan Administration
years and a measure of federal financial aid available in that year. For the
dependent variables of applications and acceptance ratios, we also controlled the
aggregate number of applications from all students that year.
We reported each of these trends in more detail elsewhere, 72 but Table 1
summarizes these findings. In general, they reinforce our conclusions that
Bakke had little specific impact on trends in minority applications, admissions,
and first-year enrollment. Though the fit of the models range from good to
excellent, only two of the Bakke coefficients are significant.
In examining the longer time series that extends through 1997, it seems
clear that the growth in minority applications and enrollments occurred at two
points. First, there was a sharp increase after the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as legal barriers fell and professional schools became aware of the
need to recruit minority, particularly African-American, students to their
institutions. In addition, competition for admission to professional schools was
growing tremendously at this time. 73 Second, there was a significant increase in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. This increase may best be attributed to the
growing middle class in the African-American community and the large
increase in the number of college educated minorities.74 These developments
71 Jesse Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. Rnv. 1, 7 (1983).
72 See John Gruhl & Susan Welch, The Impact of the Bakke Decision on Minority
Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 458-71 (1990).
73 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 7, at 52-53.
74 For example, before 1975, only about 13% of all African-American families earned
more than $50,000 (1994) dollars. This estimate rose to about 17% by 1985. By 1994, it had
risen to over 21%. Among Hispanics, the comparable figures for 1975 and 1994 are 13%
and 19%. During this same time, the numbers of individuals attending college rose from 1.1
million to 1.8 million among African Americans and from 0.4 million to 1.2 million among
Hispanics.
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led to an increase in the number of families who were able to send their children
to professional schools. In addition, an economic boom in the early to mid-
1990s reduced unemployment and induced some income growth, making it
possible for more students to attend college. This growth in minority enrollment
began nearly a decade after Bakke and is highly unlikely to have been affected
by it.
Table I:Blacks, Hispanics, and Bakke
A. Blacks Only
Pre-Bakke Post- Short Term Fit of Model*
Trend Bakke Change (R)
Trend
# of applicants to medical school 83 145 -37 .95
% of medical school class -. 17 -.11 -.05 .63
% of law school class -.01 .08 -.15 .65
% of African Americans accepted, -1.46" 1.33 1.73 .88
medical school
Acceptance ratio, medical school -.06* .02 .02 .99
B. Hispanics Only
Pre-Bakke Post- Short Term Fit of Model*
Trend Bakke Change (R2)Trend II
# of applicants to medical school 52* -54 26 .97
% of medical school class .25* .06 .01 .98
% of law school class .15* .11 -.08 .93
% of Hispanics accepted, 1.70* 1.51 7.36* .86
medical school
Acceptance ratio, medical school -.01 .00 .10* .91
* The coefficients reflect the effect of these variables contr oiling for other variables in the model, including a
dummy variable for the Reagan Administration years, a measure of federal financial aid available, and, for the
applicant and acceptance measure, an indicator of the number of applications from all students.
B. The Effect on Individual Institutions
Another way to explore the impact of Bakke is to look at individual
institutions before and after the decisions. Aggregated national data could
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conceivably obscure important gains in individual institutions. If Bakke changed
patterns and intensities of minority recruiting, we might expect that effect to be
apparent in the distribution of minority gains and losses among different types
of schools. For example, we might expect the effect to be less apparent in states
with small minority populations. We might also expect a bigger gain in northern
schools, rather than southern schools, where resistance to civil rights was more
intense.75 For this analysis, we used the total minority enrollment in the school,
rather than just first-year enrollment.76
The overall growth in minority enrollments in the typical medical or law
school between 1978-the time of Bakke-and 1987 was extremely small.
Medical schools, for which we have data on blacks and Hispanics, increased
their overall enrollment by thirty-five students during this decade, and about
one-third of this small growth was in minority students. However, African-
American enrollment grew by only .19%, and, on average, Hispanic enrollment
grew by .75%. Law schools, in which our data are for "minorities"-a
combination of African Americans and Hispanics-actually decreased in overall
enrollment during this decade, but the minority proportion of their enrollment
increased 2.63 %.
Table 2 illustrates that, institution by institution, minority enrollment in
1987 is highly related to minority enrollment a decade earlier. This is most true
for African-American students attending medical schools, where earlier
enrollment explains over 93 % of the variation in 1987 enrollment (shown in the
table as R2). This conclusion is almost as true for African Americans attending
law schools, where the variation explained is 89%, and somewhat less true for
Hispanics in medical school where the explained variation is only 57%. A high
proportion of variation means that those schools with high minority enrollments
in 1987 also had high enrollments in 1977, and the same is true for those
schools with medium and low enrollments.
If Bakke had an effect on professional schools' treatment of minority
applicants, one would expect this effect to vary greatly among institutions, with
some moving ahead dramatically and others lagging behind. If so, we should
not have expected to find an extremely strong relationship between minority
enrollments before and after Bakke. However, the strong relationship found
between previous and current minority enrollments suggests that the decision
reinforced existing patterns of minority recruiting. Whatever factors promoted
75 See James H. Kuklinski et al., Racial Attitudes and the "New South," 59 J. OF POL.
323-49 (1997).
76 First-year minority enrollment was not available for law schools. Law school data for
1977 were not available, so we used 1979 data. Unfortunately, this captures the first-year
post-Bakke class, so the data are partially contaminated. However, two-thirds of the law
students would have been accepted before Bakke.
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minority enrollment in 1977, also did so in 1987. The possible exception is
Hispanic medical school enrollment, in which the variation between the 1987
enrollment and the 1977 enrollment, while substantial, is considerably less than
in the other two cases. However, as we will see in the next table, there are other
factors in addition to Bakke that help explain changing Hispanic enrollments.
Table 2: The Impact of Earlier Minority Enrollment on 1987 Minority
Enrollment 77
Medical Schools Medical Schools Law Schools
Blacks Hispanics Minorities
% of group enrolled before .93 .76 .84
Bakke
(t) (39.08) (12.13) (36.49)
Constant .62 1.12 4.04
R2  .93 .57 .89
In Table 3 we examine the impact of 1977 enrollment on 1987 enrollment,
while taking into account several other possible predictors of minority
enrollment.78 The table indicates that none of these other factors affected black
enrollment in medical schools. Although the 1977 enrollment remains an
extremely strong predictor of 1987 enrollment, neither the type of school or the
proportion of blacks in the state population, enrollment, or changing enrollment
are related to African-American enrollments in 1987. 79 Indeed, adding these
factors to the equation only increases the explained variation in enrollment by a
nonsignificant 1%, from 93% to 94%.
Hispanic enrollment continues to be strongly predicted by previous
Hispanic enrollment (as we saw in Table 2, it explains 57% of the variation),
77 The dependent variable is the percent of African Americans, Hispanics, and
minorities enrolled in 1987. The coefficients shown are unstandardized regression coefficients
(b values). An example of the interpretation is as follows: for every percent of African-
American enrollment before Bakke, in 1987 there was .93% Aflican-American enrollment
plus a constant of .62%. Thus, a medical school with a 10% African-American enrollment in
1977 can be predicted to have a 9.92% enrollment in 1987 (10 x .93 + .62). A law school
with a 10% minority enrollment in 1977 can be predicted to have a 12.44% enrollment in
1987 (10 x .84 + 4.04). N= 112 for medical schools and 164 for law schools.
78 Multicollinearity between region and the proportion of African Americans impels us
to delete region from the equations.
79 Note that this does not mean that the state's African-American population percent is
not related to 1987 enrollments. The two are related at r=.38. But, its effect is indirect,
through the 1977 enrollment proportions.
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but the proportion of Hispanic population in the state also is an important
predictor of that enrollment. Hispanic medical enrollment grew by a larger
proportion than did African-American enrollment, and it is clear that much of
this growth took place in states with larger Hispanic populations. These states,
such as Florida, Texas, and California, are also the site of much of the increase
in the Hispanic population. The impact of a state's Hispanic population is
largely responsible for the increase in the R2 from .57-with only the 1977
enrollment figures as a predictor-to .70 in this equation.
Table 3: Impact of Previous Minority Enrollment and
Proportions of Minority Enrollment s °
Medical Schools
Blacks Hispanics
% of group enrolled
before Bakke .92 .35
(35.45) (4.22)
Other Factors on 1987
Law Schools
Minorities
.82
(33.83)
% blacks in state's population
% Hispanic in state's population
Number of students enrolled
Change in number enrolled
Major state university
Other state university
Constant
.03 -.01
-.00 .22
(-.01) (5.90)
.14 .12
(1.17) (1.46)
-.32
(-1.49)
.19
(.35)
.92
(1.29)
-.61
(-.74)
-.11
(-.69)
.01
(1.45)
.00
(.06)
1.12
(-.33)
.70
Minority enrollment in law schools is somewhat affected by the black and
Hispanic proportions in a state. However, together the additional predictors
increase the R2 only from .89 (with only previous enrollment as a predictor) to
.91. Still, beyond their effects on 1979 minority enrollment, the proportions of
80 N=112 for medical schools; 163 for law schools. Significant coefficients are in bold
.15
(3.24)
.06
(.57)
-.35
(-1.98)
-.47
(-.64)
-.69
(-.82)
2.42
(2.88)
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Hispanics in a state are significantly related to 1987 enrollment as well.
Contrary to expectations, minority enrollment in 1987 is higher in those law
schools that have decreased their overall enrollment, with all other things being
equal. As with minority enrollments in medical school, there are no effects of
overall enrollment and type of university.
In both medical and law schools, African-American and Hispanic
enrollment a decade after Bakke was very much related to enrollment before
Bakke. Though some professional schools moved ahead faster than others in this
decade, on the whole, schools that had larger proportions of minorities before
the decision had them a decade later. But not all variation in 1987 minority
enrollments was explained; we have seen that the Hispanic population of the
state affected changes in Hispanic enrollment and, in law schools, overall
minority enrollment.
C. The Views of Admissions Officials
Viewpoints of admissions officials, who screen applications and make
decisions about whom to admit, provide a third kind of evidence about the
impact of Bakke. Through reports in the popular and specialized media, and
through the activities and publications of the Association of American Colleges
of Medicine and the American Association of Law Schools, it is clear that
professors, deans, and admissions officers at both medical and law schools had.
ample information about the Bakke decision at the time it was handed down and
immediately afterward. 8' "Given that attention in professional as well as
popular media, it is not surprising that eleven years after the decision, fully 97%
of the medical admissions officers and 99% of their law school counterparts had
heard of the decision." 82
Most of these officials perceived that Bakke has had minimal impact on
admissions policies. For example, officials were asked whether the decision
changed their admissions policies at the time Bakke was decided and whether it
affected their policies at the time of the survey, which was conducted nearly a
decade later.83 Almost no one reported that the decision changed their policies
significantly at the time of the decision. However, 11% of the medical school
officials and 17% of the law school officials in the survey reported that it
changed their policies "somewhat." 84 As indicated in Figure 4, over three-
81 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 7.
82 Id. at 67-68. What is surprising about the aftermath of Bakke is that there were a
handful of admissions officials who had not heard of the decision.
83 See id. at 74.
84 Examples given by respondents of such small changes include one who noted that
they are more conscious of what they are doing in minority recruitment and another who said
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quarters of the surveyed medical school officials and 63 % of the law school
officials claim that it affected policies "not at all." One school official said,
"[w]e have always upheld affirmative action."'85 Another respondent reported
that its affirmative action policy remained essentially unchanged since
1968.86 Thus, only a small minority of schools reported that Bakke changed
rather than reaffirmed their admissions policies.
Fig r_4: Admission Officials' Perceptions of Bakke's Impact
100
80 77
i 63
60 L
40 -
20 - 17 19
2 10
0
Significant Somewhat Slight None
Extent of impact on admissions decisions
U Medical school MLaw school
Source: Survey Questionnmires
Law=84; med=63
Similar to the minority of respondents who asserted that Bakke changed
their policies when the decision was handed down, another' minority of
respondents reported that the decision had an impact on their decisions in 1989
when we conducted the'survey. One fear of those who opposed the decision was
that public attention and professional school actions would focus on the portion
their policies are slightly more flexible. One medical official said they ceased using "two
lists," one for majority and one for minority applicants. One official said race became less of
a factor, and two officials said that it became more of one.
85 See WLcH & GRUHL, supra note 7, at 74. This respondent clearly had a restrictive
definition of "always."
86 See id.
1998]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
of the Court's decision outlawing quotas, rather than the portion of the Court's
decision affirming the use of race as a positive factor.87 "If this emphasis were
to occur, these detractors believed, eventually efforts to recruit minorities would
cease and opportunities for minorities would diminish." 88 Despite the fears of
some officials, the majority of medical and law school officials did not believe
that opportunities for minorities were diminished as a result of Bakke. In fact, of
those who believed that Bakke has had a continuing impact, more believed it has
worked to increase the admissions of minority students than to limit admissions.
Indeed, among law school respondents, twice as many believed the decision has
opened the doors wider than believed it has closed them tighter. Among medical
respondents, only slightly more respondents believed that Bakke improved
access for minorities than believed it limited access. Most admissions officials
believed that Bakke legitimized existing practices rather than changed them, and
where it did change practices, most officials believed Bakke improved them.
Figure5: Consider Race a Positive Factor in Admissions Before and After Bakke
100 go 3-95  93
t 90 -- 89
185 r_385 82 81
80 77
71 70
I I'~~ 64 617
60 .'
40
20 - ..... . 18 16
Blacks Hispanics Native Americans Asian Americans
Type of student considered
MIMedical, before Bakke iMedical, after Bakke
ElLaw, before Bakke 0,Law, after Bakke
Source: Survey Questionnaires
Law=67 before, 87 after; med=n=61 before, 68 after
There -is till more evidence that the impact of Bakke was to legitimize
policies rather than change them. Respondents were asked whether they took
87 See id.
88 Id.
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race into account before Bakke and whether they take race into account, as a
positive factor, in making decisions today. Most schools took race into account
in a positive way before the decision, and a few more schools did afterwards.
The safest conclusion to reach is that the decision apparently did not deter
schools from considering race as a positive factor, and may even have
encouraged a handful. Being black, Hispanic, or a Native American earns
students positive credit in the admissions process at most law and medical
schools. As indicated in Figure 5, by 1989, over 95% of law and 90% of
medical schools gave extra consideration to African Americans. Moreover,
93% of law schools and 69% of medical schools did the same for Hispanics. 89
D. Some Conclusions
Many commentators, referring to the "chilling effect of Bakke," predicted
that the ruling, by invalidating quotas, would result in fewer applications by
minority students, less pressure on schools to admit them, and, consequently,
smaller minority enrollments. 90 Over time, supporters of affirmative action
came to view Bakke as an essential stimulus to minority enrollment. Based on
this systematic study of Bakke's impact, we conclude that its effect on boosting
or curtailing minority enrollment was far less than either supporters or
opponents predicted. Nonetheless, the decision was significant because it
legitimated and institutionalized the practice of affirmative action in admissions
decisions. Bakke outlawed racial quotas, but the decision also validated
affirmative action practices that give some positive weight to the race or
ethnicity of candidates. 91 Therefore, although Bakke is increasingly under
challenge, it continues to be the Supreme Court decision underpinning
affirmative action in higher education admissions.
We are confident in our conclusions, but we realize there are limits to this
study. As with any examination of the impact of a Supreme Court case, it is
difficult to separate the effect of the Court's ruling from the effects of other
factors occurring at the time. Minimizing the period of the series analysis
reduces, but does not eliminate, the number of other factors conceivably
89 These proportions are very similar to those reported for African Americans in a 1974
survey of medical schools, but lower for Native Americans, Asian-Americans, and
Hispanics. See Wellington & Montero, Equal Educational Opportniity Programs in
American Medical Schools, 53 J. oF MID. EDUC., 633-39 (1978). African Americans were
the most likely to receive preferential treatment, followed by Native Americans, Hispanics,
and Asians. Differences could be in recall of our respondents and different samples, as well
as changing practices.
90 See WELCH & GRuHIL, supra note 7, at 30.
91 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272, 317 (1979).
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affecting minority enrollment. Moreover, predicting individual behavior from
aggregate characteristics is always risky. We have examined decisions made by
a few thousand students and a few hundred schools in our aggregate analysis,
but we have tried to predict their behavior with variables affecting millions.
Ideally, we would have conducted a before and after study of both
individuals and institutions. It would have been useful to examine students'
reasons for applying or not applying to professional schools to see if their
reasons differed before and after Bakke, and indeed to determine if students
were even aware of Bakke and its predicted impact. Moreover, such a before
and after design could have been profitably used to study the admissions
process. However, even at the time we conducted our survey, much time had
passed since the decision. Therefore, we have no "before" information from
individuals and admissions committees except for responses based on memory.
Thus, we assembled the best evidence we could after the decision and relied on
a multiplicity of sources. 92
Given this evidence, our conclusions are reasonably straightforward.
Admissions officials said in response to our questionnaire that the impact on
their decisions was "none" or "slight." Hardly any respondents said the impact
was "significant." Our analyses of aggregate applications, acceptances, and
enrollments confirm these officials' impressions. In particular, the impact of
Bakke on the number of minority applicants or enrollees was minimal. The
schools with the most minorities the year before Bakke were the ones with the
most minorities a decade later, and those schools with the least number of
minorities before the decision were the ones with the least minorities after the
decision. Patterns of institutional behavior tend to persist, and professional
school enrollment before and after Bakke is certainly an example of that
persistence.
Our conclusions reinforce the findings of some previous studies on the
impact of Supreme Court decisions. 93 Such studies confirm the impression that
the impact of Supreme Court decisions is often different than what would be
expected from reading the decision or even from reading media reports about its
presumed consequences. Cases considered significant at the time the decisions
92 See WELCH & GRUHL, supta note 7, at 179-80.
93 See generally STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME
CouRT 16-22 (1970) (discussing the "impact theory," and how Supreme Court decisions
impact areas such as economics, politics, and public opinion differently); CHARLEs A.
JOHNsON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL PoucIEs 4 (1984) (examining the impact of
translating judicial policies as a political process subject to a variety of pressures from a
variety of political actors); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 30 (1991) (combining the "Constrained Court" and the
"Dynamic Court" views to understand how the Court can bring significant reform).
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are rendered do not always have an impact other than the legal and political
commentary that follow in their wake. Indeed, the most fundamental finding of
these studies is that rulings do not always change behavior in the expected way,
to the expected extent, or at all.
To a great extent, the minimal impact Supreme Court decisions produce
derives from the refusal of the parties involved and the lower courts to comply
with the ruling. If they do comply, the results might be different from the ones
intended, or the effect might be far less than the extent anticipated. Moreover, if
there is an impact, it often varies from place to place. 94 Studies relevant to
Bakke have concluded that decisions that are ambiguous,95 which contradict the
norms of the community or beliefs of those who are to enforce the law,96 or
which challenge the organizational status quo,97 may be less likely to be fully
implemented. For example, after the Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizona,98 some police officers did not advise suspects of their rights to silence
9 4 See JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 93, at 229-69.
9 5 See DAVID W. NEUBAuER, CRIMINAL JusTIcE IN MIDDLE AMERICA 164-68 (1974)
(discussing why the Supreme Court's decisions limiting police investigatory powers were
imprecise and had little effect); see also HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S.
BULLOCK, IIl, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 198-99 (1972) (noting that in civil rights law, an
ambiguous decision will be "too indefinite to bring about meaningful change"); Bradley
Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels:
The Case of the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57, 71 (1977).
9 6 See KENNErH M. DOLBEARE & PHajuP E. HAMMOND, THM SCHOOL PRAYER
DECISIONS 23 (1971) (noting in the Court's schoolhouse religion cases, the community as a
whole preferred to continue prayer in school, but elite community leaders supported the
Court); see also RICHARD M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE 143 (1967) (stating
the impact of Supreme Court policy depends upon whether the policy is relevant to the
community and whether key actors are aware of such relationships); Robert H. Birkby, The
Supreme Court and the Bible Belt, 10 MiDwEsT J. POL. Sci. 304, 305-07 (1966) (contrasting
the Supreme Court's prayer in public school decisions with the views of the public school
boards and communities involved). See generally JOHN HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL
PRAYERS 98 (1969) (noting a consistent public opposition to the Court's disposition of
church-state matters); WmLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN TIE PULIC SCHOOLS 59 (1967)
(discussing the Court's "separatist self-image").
97 See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 93, at 362 (asserting the Supreme Court's
attempt to bring social change has strengthened opponents to change); Richard J. Medalie et
al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement
Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1394 (1968) (stating Miranda did not ensure police would
suddenly conform to the ruling).
98 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (requiring a suspect in custody must be "adequately and
effectively appraised of his rights" and guaranteed "a continuous opportunity to exercise
them").
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and to an attorney before interrogating them.99 Other officers did advise
suspects, but nonetheless found them more willing to confess than to exercise
their rights.100 Therefore, contrary to predictions, there was only a small
decline in confessions following Miranda.'0'
Courts must rely on others to implement their decisions.1 02 For Bakke,
admissions officials and others who affect admissions decisions formed the
implementing population. Despite initial fears by civil rights organizations,
hindsight indicates that most of these officials were at least somewhat committed
to increasing minority enrollment. 103 Because admissions officials believed they
should make this effort, they established procedures to increase enrollment.
However, to the extent that the Court's ruling made this goal more difficult to
achieve, these officials might be less than enthusiastic to implement these
procedures. Our findings that the schools with the best record of minority
enrollment before Bakke were also the schools with the best record a decade
after Bakke suggest the influence of the implementing population.
The Court must rely also upon others to communicate the rule to those who
must implement it.1°4 As we previously noted, law and medical school officials
were very aware of the Bakke decision. However, the ruling itself was not
clear, and ample communication of an ambiguous message still leaves an
99 See Medalie et al., supra note 97, at 1394. The authors state that after the Miranda
decision, police officers did not adopt the Court's policies. For example, half of the
defendants studied were not given the silence warning, less than two-thirds reported they
were denied the station-house counsel warning, and more than two-thirds reported they were
not given any of the formal Miranda warnings. See id.
100 See id. at 1395 (noting defendants were "loathe" to use attorneys, often giving
statements because they did not understand how Miranda applied to them); see also
Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1578 (1967)
(reporting that 19 out of 37 defendants in their study did not react to the Miranda warnings
and incriminated themselves).
101 But see Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh: A
Statistical Study, 29 U. PrT. L. REv. 1, 23 (1967). The authors' study on Miranda reported
a 20% decline in the percentage of cases in which a defendant gives a confession. See id.
102 See JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 93, at 77. The authors define an "implementing
population" as persons who carry out and translate judicial policies into action. See id. In
most cases, the implementing population is "a group effort by some bureaucratic
organization." Id. at 77-78. However, members of the population tend to be diverse. See id.
at 77.
103 See WELCH & GRuHL, supra note 7, at 124.
104 See JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 93; at 81-82 (stating that implementing agencies
often interpret judicial decisions and lower courts only sometimes help elaborate on the
interpretation).
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ambiguous message. 105 These ambiguities might have been clarified by
subsequent rulings, but the Justices did not take any related cases in school
admissions. Thus far, the Court has left Bakke as its last words on the subject of
affirmative action in education.
Whether a ruling has an impact also depends upon the "consumer
population"-those individuals who will gain benefits or suffer losses under the
ruling.106 Bakke's "consumer population" consisted of the actual and potential
applicants to professional schools, both minorities and nonminorities. We found
that the impact for these individuals was relatively small, affecting either their
rate of applying to professional schools or their opportunities to be admitted.
Finally, we can examine the impact of the decision on the "secondary
population," which includes those not directly affected by the decision. 107 The
media, of course, are a relevant part of the secondary population. The media
clearly covered the Bakke decision, but the coverage was primarily superficial.
In fact, the media provided very little information to readers about the nature of
affirmative action practices beyond those at UC-Davis. Indeed, the media did
not begin to describe the way affirmative action practices work at a variety of
institutions until well over a decade after the Bakke decision. In the few years
following Bakke, the lack of intense media interest helped defuse the issue and
contributed to the legitimization of affirmative action. The lack of media
concern, coupled with the lack of further judicial scrutiny in the decade after
Bakke, also allowed some institutions to drift back into near-quota systems in
their affirmative action practices.10 8
Thus, Bakke appears to have solidified the existing practice of affirmative
action in admissions. While formal quotas disappeared, actions to maintain and
increase minority enrollments became institutionalized. Admissions officials
look differently at test scores and grade point averages of minority applicants
compared with white, non-Hispanic applicants, and, until the 1990s, most
105 See generally John Gmhl, State Supreme Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court's Post-
Miranda Rulings, 72 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 886, 888-89 (1981) (discussing how clear
decisions, and those that are not specific, effect compliance with the Court's decision); Neil
T. Romans, The Role of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy Making: Escobedo,
Miranda, and the Use of Judicial Impact Analysis, 27 W. POL. Q. 38, 58 (1974) (asserting
that a vague Supreme Court decision allows a lower court to follow its own policies, but a
clear decision requires lower courts to follow the decision at least to its minimum boundary).
106 See JOHNSON & CANNON, supra note 93, at 107 (defining "consumer population" as
those persons who are personally affected by the particular decision).
107 See JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 93, at 110 (defining secondary population as
those persons "not personally affected by a judicial policy").
108 See WELcH & GRUHL, supra note 7, at 154-55.
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university officials appeared to take this practice for granted. 109 By legitimizing
this practice, Bakke allowed the growth and further development of these race
conscious policies.
The change is not inconsequential. Legitimating executive and
congressional policies is one of the most important functions of the courts.
Many people assume that Marbury v. Madison, °10 which articulated the Court's
authority to exercise judicial review, was the Supreme Court's most important
ruling. However, some legal scholars insist that McCulloch v.
Maryland,"' which upheld the government's authority to create and operate a
national bank, was actually more important. Robert McCloskey wrote that
McCulloch was "by almost any reckoning the greatest decision John Marshall
ever handed down-the one most important to the future of America, most
influential in the Court's own doctrinal history .... "112 McCulloch was
important because the Court legitimated government action." 3 In his analysis of
the role of the Court, Robert Dahl concluded that "the main contribution of the
Court is to confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies" of the governing
coalition." 4 Otherwise, the Court would interfere with the democratic process.
It is not necessary for us to go this far to agree that legitimating governmental
policy is an important function for the courts and to see that legitimating
affirmative action was an important result of the Bakke case.
V. EPILoGuE: DoES BAKKE MATrER TODAY?
Today the Bakke decision is threatened, both by court decisions and by the
changing political environment. Supporters of affirmative action, who once
were skeptical of the value of the decision to their cause, urge that it continue to
be the controlling legal doctrine.115 The Supreme Court's support for
affirmative action has wavered since the late 1980s,116 and in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,117 the Court held that programs must demonstrate a
109 See id. at 143.
110 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Ill 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
1 12 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 66 (1960).
113 See id. (stating that McCulloch put "down the classic statement of the doctrine of
national authority").
114 Ro3ERT DABL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNrrED STATES 200-10 (1972).
115 See the amicus curaie briefs to Hopwood, for example.
116 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); see also City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
117 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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"compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored." 118 Similar
reasoning in Miller v. Johnson119 prompted the majority of the Court to hold
unlawful the practice of gerrymandering to create "minority-majority" voting
districts. 120
These cases did not involve higher education, but some federal courts of
appeals have tackled the use of racial classifications in that arena. The Fourth
Circuit in Podberesky v. Kirwan121 ruled that a University of Maryland
scholarship program exclusively for blacks was unconstitutional. 122 The court,
stating that a history of discrimination by itself cannot justify race conscious
remedies, concluded that this program was not narrowly tailored to overcome
the school's past discrimination because it was open to African Americans from
all states, including those financially well off as well as those who were
needy.' 23 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The decision in Hopwood v. Teas 12 4 directly threatens the Bakke
precedent. In 1994, four white students sued the University of Texas Law
School after being denied admission, challenging the school's goal of filling
10% of the seats for Mexican Americans and 5% for African
Americans. 125 Additionally, the plaintiffs also challenged the school's
procedures for evaluating the applications of minorities. 126 The federal district
court upheld the numerical goal, noting that the percentages had varied during
the past ten years, 127 but invalidated the procedures used because they entailed
separate screening of minorities from whites, as Powell's opinion in Bakke
criticized. 128 Hopwood upheld the right of colleges to consider race and
ethnicity, but ruled out the use of separate committees for evaluating white and
minority applicants, as well as the use of different minimum test scores and
grade point averages for minority applicants.' 29 Reaffirming the general
118 Id. at 228-37 (discussing application of strict scrutiny).
119 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
120 See id. at 924-28.
121 38 F.3d 147 (1995).
122 See id. at 161.
123 See id. See generally Scott Jaschik, Blow to Affirmative Action, THE CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUc., June 23, 1995, at A21-22 (discussing the possible impact of the "compelling
government interest" and "narrowly tailored" standards on colleges).
124 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
12 5 See id. at 560.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 574.
128 See id. at 577-78.
129 See id. at 579.
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURINAL
principles of Bakke, the federal district court refused to order the admission of
plaintiffs. 130
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court and issued the
most sweeping affirmative action decision yet. 131 Rejecting all justifications the
school put forth, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the law school could not use race or
ethnicity as a factor in admissions. 132 Apparently, the only justification for the
use of race would be clear evidence of present effects of past discrimination by
the law school itself, but the court couched this possibility in such restrictive
language that such a finding would be nearly impossible to show to the judges'
satisfaction. 133 Though there had clearly been de jure discrimination before the
1960s, as evidenced by the invalidation of a university's de jure discrimination
in Sweatt v. Painter134 in 1949 and the state public schools' dejure segregation
in Brown v. Board of Education135 in 1954, the Court asserted that there had
been no discrimination since the 1960s.136
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit took direct aim at the Bakke decision.
Referring to Justice Powell's "lonely opinion," the court emphasized that there
was no majority opinion and thus no binding precedent to justify race conscious
remedies as means to achieve diversity. 137 Remarkably, they said that the use of
race in admissions promotes no more diversity than would the use of applicants'
blood type. To think otherwise, they argued, is to stereotype people. 138 The
court essentially rejected the existence of any shared experience of persons due
to their race. 139
The university appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Justices denied
certiorari.14° As is their custom, the Court issued no opinion to explain why,
but two Justices did issue their own opinion.141 Justices Ginsburg and Souter
noted that the question of the constitutionality of a public school's use of race or
national origin is of great national importance. However, the Justices stated that
they considered the case moot because the law school discontinued separate
130 See id. at 580-82.
131 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
132 See id. at 948.
133 See id. at 951-52.
134 339 U.S. 629, 633-36 (1949).
135 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
136 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
137 See id. at 944-45.
138 See id. at 945.
139 See id. at 946.
140 See Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
141 See id. at 2581-82.
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admissions procedures for minority and nonminority applicants after the district
court's decision.1 42 Because the other Justices did not join or issue opinions, it
is unclear whether they agreed or simply hoped to postpone such a contentious
and divisive matter.
Hopwood only applies to the states in the Fifth Circuit-Texas, Louisiana,
and Mississippi. Ultimately the issue will have to be resolved by the Supreme
Court. Its conservative membership and recent decisions on affirmative action
and civil rights issues suggest that the Court might weaken, if not discard,
Powell's opinion in Bakke.1 43
In the wake of these decisions, the nearly unanimous verdict of the media is
that these decisions have had a crushingly negative effect on attempts to
diversify higher education nationally, particularly in California and the Fifth
Circuit states to which Hopwood applies.144 For example, the media reported
that the fall 1997 class of minority students at the University of Texas Law
School and at the University of California Law School (Boalt Hall) declined
dramatically.' 45 At Boalt Hall, for example, the number of blacks admitted fell
81% from 75 students to just 14 in 1996. The number of Hispanics admitted fell
50%, while the number of Asians increased 18%, and the number of whites
increased 15 %.146 Texas Law School accepted just 5 African-American and 18
Mexican-American Students, compared to 65 and 70 a year ago.' 47
In reaction to the news of falling minority applications at the University of
Texas, the Texas legislature passed a law in 1997 to circumvent the Hopwood
ruling. 148 The law requires Texas state universities to admit all applicants from
Texas high schools who graduated in the top ten percent of their class,
essentially substituting geography for race.149 After these slots are filled, the
universities can use other race-neutral criteria to choose the remaining
142 See id. at 2582.
143 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1983).
144 See Ben Gose, Elite Private Colleges See a Drop in Applications, THE CHRON. OF
HIGHEREDUC., Mar. 7, 1997, at A35.
145 See id. at A35.
146 See Michelle Locke, School's Minority Admissions Drop with New Policy,
CHATrANOOGA TIES, May 15, 1997, at A16, available in LEXIS, News Library.
147 See Ways and Means, THE CHRON. OF HIGHm EDUC., Apr. 18, 1997, at A28
[hereinafter Ways and Means].
148 See Patrick Healy, Texas Lawmakers Take an Activist Role on Issues Affecting
Higher Education, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 13, 1997, at B4.
149 See id.
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students. 150 This creative approach, one commentator observed, "takes one of
this country's worst social tragedies, its racially segregated neighborhoods, and
uses it to create a college applicant pool that reflects the state's racial, ethnic,
and economic diversity." 151
But is the verdict of the catastrophic effect of Hopwood and the new
California laws accurate? Is the changed legal environment affecting
applications, decisions by admissions committees, or both? The evidence is
somewhat more mixed than most media accounts. At some campuses of the
University of California system, for example, the number of minorities in the
fall 1998 class, the first class accepted under the anti-social preference policy,
increased.152 However, the number of minorities in the fall 1998 class
decreased at both UCLA and Berkeley, which are the most competitive
campuses in the University of California system. Similarly, minority
enrollments in University of California law and business schools decreased,
while minority enrollments in graduate schools did not decrease. 153
The best overall evidence we have is from national data on medical
school applications and admissions, though even there we have some gaps
in needed information. As previously shown in Figure 3, black and
Hispanic applications to medical schools declined nationally. Figure 6
places this in perspective by showing white applications alongside blacks'
and Hispanics', demonstrating that the number of white applicants are also
declining. In fact, the decline in white applications began in 1996, one year
after the beginning. of the African American decline, and one year before
the decline in Latino applications began. From 1996 to 1997, the number of
white applicants dropped over 8%, which is comparable to the 9% decline
in African-American applicants. However, the drop in Latino applicants
was larger, exceeding over 14%.
150 See Ways and Means, supra note 147, at A29.
151 Clarence Page, Usefid Ways to Diversify Colleges Sprout From Anti-Quota
Crusades, FREsNO BEE, June 5, 1997, at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library.
152 See James Ramage, Berkeley and UCLA See Sharp Drops in Admission of Black and
Hispanic Applicants, 44 THE CHRON. OF IGHER EDuc., Apr. 10, 1998, at A43.
15 3 See Julianne Basinger, U. of Cal. Reports on Minority Enrollment, 42 THE CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDuc., Jan. 30, 1998, at A28.
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Figure 6: Applications to Medical School, by Ethnicity
Thousands
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AAMC. "Facts," October 1997. Data on whites are divided by 10.
Somewhat counteracting these trends, in 1997, medical school admissions
officers increased the proportion of students accepted in all major groups,
including African Americans and Latinos. 154 Thus the decline in white,
African-American, and Latino students admitted is only 1%, 3%, and 9%
respectively. From these early returns, it appears that Hispanics, rather than
African Americans, experienced the major effects on minority admissions to
medical school, and the negative effect is confined to the decisions of students to
apply rather than to decisions of the admissions committees to admit.
The particular effect on Hispanics may reflect the fact that a large
proportion of Latinos live in Texas and California, where Hopwood and the
changes in the California law are most salient. In 1998, the Association of
American Medical Colleges ("AAMC") reported that the number of minorities
who applied to medical school in the four states most affected by the Hopwood
decision-California, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas-declined by 17% (a
total of 125 students), and this decline accounted for almost 40% of the total
decline in minority applications. 155 The AAMC did not indicate how many
154 See AssOCIArON OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, FACrS: APPLICANTS,
MATRICULANTS, GRADUATES, 1991-1997 (1998).
155 See id.
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fewer students were admitted to medical schools in these states; therefore, we
do not know if admissions committees partly compensated for this large decline.
These data modify the more simplified story portrayed in the press, but
leave many questions unanswered. Is the decline in applications a one-year
phenomenon or will it persist? To what extent is the declining application rate
among minorities attributable to either improved job opportunities available to
all college graduates as a result of the very healthy economy, or to the overall
declining interest in medical school as evidenced by decreasing white, black,
and Latino applications? To what extent can admissions officials offset declining
minority applications, and have they done so in the targeted anti-affirmative
action states?
It would be extremely unusual for a set of court decisions to have a
dramatic impact on the consumer population; we have just shown that such an
impact did not occur after the Bakke decision. It is more likely that the decisions
would have an impact on the university admissions officials who implement the
decisions.156 It appears, though, that in the wake of the Hopwood decision, the
greater effect has been on the decisions of students to apply. However, this
conclusion must await further evidence.
In addition to court decisions affecting affirmative action policy and policy
decisions such as those made by the state of California and the Board of Regents
of the University of California, a number of other elements lead some to
conclude that the future of affirmative action is, and perhaps should be, dim.
Public support is weak, with no signs of change. Most Republican national
office holders and some Democrats oppose affirmative action. 157 Moreover,
moving in parallel with this acrimonious public debate is a major change in the
face of America, or more particularly, the faces of Americans. 158 These
changes include the immigration of millions of nonwhites, the increasing
intermarriage of whites and nonwhites, and, consequently, the increasing
ambiguity of race and ethnicity in America.159 We are not so naive to argue that
156 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 7, at 136-38.
157 See, e.g., GOP Shelves Plans to Cut Back Affirmative Action Programs, CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 5-37-38 (1996).
158 For a brief review of the changing face of America, see WELCH & GRUHL, supra
note 7, at 161-63.
159 See Tom Morganthau, What Color is Black?, NEWsWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 63-64.
America is becoming a multiracial society with a growing rate of intermarriage and mixed
race births. Between 1970 and 1994, the number of interracial married couples more than
quadrupled. See Gary Younge, What am I?, WASH. PosT NAT'L WKLY. EDmON, July 29,
1996, at 30-31. About 25% of marriages involving minorities other than African Americans
are interracial. Moreover, over one-quarter of all marriages involving a Latino (a diverse
category, which is neither a race nor a specific ethnic group) is to a non-Latino. For statistics
regarding interracial relationships, see Laura K. Yax, U.S. Census Bureau the Official
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America has now become a true melting pot, but, at a time when common
wisdom indicates that the melting pot is only a myth, the melting is proceeding
faster than at any time in the past. As a result of the increase in intermarriage,
there has been an increase in mixed-race births. 16° Over two million children
are in interracial families. 161 The proportion of mixed race births is much
higher among groups covered by affirmative action policies.' 62 For example,
there are now 39% more Japanese-white births than there are births to two
Japanese-American parents. 163 Interracial births between American Indians and
non-Indians exceed single race American-Indian births by 40%. 164 However,
the categorization of Americans by race and ethnicity is essential to the
operation of affirmative action.
On the other hand, there is evidence that there is considerable support for
affirmative action in some segments of society-in the business community,
especially in big corporations; among university officials; among the majority of
blacks and Hispanics; and among some elected officeholders.1 65 Moreover,
racism still exists in this society. While this may seem obvious to those who are
its victims, many opponents of affirmative action do deny its existence. The
persistence of racism cries out for remedies for its pernicious effects-if not
affirmative action, then what?
VI. CONCLUSION
We have no magic solution to this dilemma, but we will conclude by
offering a few observations that might move the discussion of affirmative action
Statistics (last modified June 11, 1998) <htp://www.census.gov/Population/www/socdemo/
interrace.htnl (indicating that the distinctiveness of this category is eroding further). A survey
of Detroit area residents in the early 1990s found that 36% of African Americans and 12% of
whites claimed a relative of another race. See Timothy Bledsoe, Michael Combs, Lee
Sigelman, & Susan Welch, Race and Place (tentative title) (undated) (on file with author).
160 See Susan Kalish, Interracial Baby Boomlet in Progress?, POpULATION TODAY,
Dec. 1992, at 1.
161 See Michael Fletcher, More Than a Black-or-White Issue, WA.SH. POST NAT'L
WKLY. EDION, May 26, 1997, at 34.
162 See Kalish, supra note 160, at 2, 9; Juanita Lott, Do United States Racial/Ethnic
Categories Still Fit?, POPULATION TODAY, Jan. 1996, at 6ff; PAUL SpIcKARD, MIxm
BLOOD: INT EMARAGE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY IN TWENTI CENTmY AMERICA (1989);
Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEw YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 44-45; Morganthau,
supra note 159, at 63-68.
163 See Kalish, supra note 160, at 2, fig.2.
164 Seeid. at9.
165 See Alan Wolfe, Affirmative Action, Inc., TE NEw YORKER, Nov. 25, 1996, at
106-115.
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policy to more productive levels. First, it would be helpful to separate the
concept of diversity from affirmative action policy. Affirmative action was
initiated as a program to try to make up for the legacy of centuries of slavery
and oppression of African Americans, yet the focus of current affirmative action
policies appears to have shifted from compensating for historical wrongs to
promoting diversity. 166 Diversity is not a value enshrined in American history
or culture. 167 Energetic efforts to make sure every group has an opportunity to
apply for admission and employment do not require special preferences for
some groups. Affirmative action is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for diversity, and the diversity that many institutions are striving for goes
beyond affirmative action categories.
Current affirmative action policies are an extremely unsophisticated and
blunt instrument whose diverse beneficiaries are not easily understood by the
wider public. These policies benefit those who suffer from current
discrimination, but they also benefit those who do not; they benefit those whose
ancestors were brought forcibly to this continent and who experienced
systematic slavery, segregation, and discrimination. However, they also benefit
those whose ancestors or who themselves came voluntarily in recent years. A
narrowly drawn affirmative action policy with specific, well defined targets
might win more public support.
Moreover, affirmative action alone can make only a little difference in
improving equality in educational and employment opportunity. Just as our
study found negligible effects by affirmative action on enrollment, most studies
of affirmative action in the workplace also found small effects. Affirmative
action is neither the key public policy that many supporters seem to believe it to
be, nor the stumbling block to white achievement that critics contend it to be. Its
actual impact appears to be modest, and its potential effects appear to be
dwarfed by economic conditions, the dramatic growth in higher education over
the past four decades, the increasing ethnic pluralism of American society, and
the changing attitudes and educational opportunities opened by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. It is quite likely that affirmative action is more a symbol than a
major impetus to further change. As one supporter has argued, "to its critics
[affirmative action] represents the decline of meritocracy, ethnic pork barrels
writ large. To its proponents, it represents fairness and minority and female
progress. In practice, it is neither a great angel nor a great Satan." 168
166 See RIcHARD D. KAmENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 75-80 (1996).
167 See id. at 28, 30; Douglas Lederman, The Special Preferences are not Limited to
Blacks, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuc., Apr. 28, 1995, at A16-18; JOHN SKRENTNY, THE
IRONIBS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
168 Liz McMillan, Berkley Professor Sees No Economic Erosion for Whites and Modest
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In conclusion, affirmative action is unlikely to ever win the kind of
support-even verbal support-that civil rights legislation has won. It is unlikely
ever to have the impact that civil rights legislation has had. However, without
some compensating policy initiatives indicating that, as a society, we are serious
about overcoming racial discrimination, rolling back affirmative action would
be perceived as a huge step backward in America's commitment to racial
equality. Mustering the national will to replace or augment affirmative action
with more effective and acceptable public policies for combating racism remains
one of this nation's biggest challenges.
Effects for Blacks, 42 THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 17, 1995, at A7 (quoting
Johnatian S. Leonard).
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